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Article 9

Judicial Administration in a System of
Independents: A Tribe with Only Chiefs
The Honorable J. Clifford Wallace*
A judge may select one of two themes for public discussion
and ordinarily expect to receive a positive, perhaps even an enthusiastic, response. One: The independence of the federal judicial branch, and of each individual judge within it, must be preserved. The other: The work of the federal courts must be more
effectively and efficiently administered. Judicial independence
and effective judicial administration are both ideals with wide
support. But, as not infrequently happens in our diverse system
of free government, ideals collide. So it is with judicial independence and judicial administration-in important areas, the rigorous pursuit of these two ideals leads to conflict.
But-and this is one of the primary theses of this Article-out of the conflict may come acceptable and even beneficial
compromise. The inevitable conflict, the inherent tension, need
not be disruptive of the work of doing justice.
In an attempt to illuminate the problems posed by the collision of the polar ideals of judicial independence and effective
judicial administration, this Article takes the following course:
Section I contains a brief summary of the historical development
and purposes of the doctrine of separation of powers and the
corollary notion of an independent judiciary. Section I1 sets forth
a review of the history of the judicial administration reform movement. This review encompasses already implemented as well as
proposed systems for controlling the work of the judiciary. It will
be proposed that the need for effective judicial administration is
more acute today than ever in our history. Section 111 identifies
several specific areas of the judicial independence-judicial administration conflict. In Section IV an attempt is made to formulate a theoretical framework for compromise. Section V examines
ways in which compromises-although not always consciously
recognized as such-have been effected and criticizes the wisdom
of those means. The judicial conference of the circuit will be
* B.A., 1952, San Diego State University; LL.B., 1955, University of California,
Berkeley (Boalt Hall); Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. This
Article is a product of Judge Wallace's tenure as a Guest Scholar, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C., June 1976.
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identified as a potentially valuable engine for achieving intelligent compromise.

In our country, the belief in the value of an independent
federal judiciary is pervasive, even sacrosanct. This belief, so
ingrained in our present thinking, did not emerge from any single
event but rather developed in an evolutionary process that had
its genesis long prior to the drafting of the Constitution. The
taproot of the idea extends to the basic doctrine of separation of
powers. This too had its evolutionary formation. Abstract thinkers in the days of Aristotle identified and analyzed many of the
functions of the state,' but the concept that the powers of state
should be separate and distinct, thus giving rise to an independence between those powers, had a much later beginning.2In the
eighteenth century, Montesquieu observed:
In every government there are three sorts of power: the
legislative; the executive in things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive in regard to matters that depend on the
civil law.
By virtue of the first, the prince or magistrate enacts temporary or perpetual laws, and amends or advocates those that
have already been enacted. By the second, he makes peace or
war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public security,
and provides against invasions. By the third, he punishes criminals, or determines the disputes that arise between individuals.
The latter we shall call the judiciary power, and the others
simply the executive powers of the state."

Significantly, Montesquieu envisaged only two manifestations of governmental power: legislative and executive. The exercise of judicial power was viewed as an executive function, and
even in that setting the power was considered unimportant. Montesquieu stated: "Of the three powers above mentioned, the judiciary is in some measure next to n ~ t h i n g . " ~
The revolution in England against the Stuart kings in 1688
provided a new basis for the separation of powers and an independent judiciary. The Magna Carta had provided that "we will
appoint justices . . . only such as know the law and mean duly
1. See ARISTOTLE,
POLITICS,bk. IV, ch. 14; see also Ervin, Separation of Powers:
PROB.108 (1970).
Judicial Independence, 35 LAW& CONTEMP.
2 . See generally A.UHLER,REVIEW
OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTS3-4 (1942).
3. B. DE MONTESQUIEU,
THESPIRITOF LAWS162-63 (T. Nugent trans. 1902).
4. Id. at 167.
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to observe it well."5 The Great Charter, however, failed to restrict
the power retained by the King to remove from office judges with
whom he did not agree. It was the Stuarts' abuse of this removal
power that led to the provision in the 1701 Act of Settlement that
"judges commissions [shall] be made [during good behavior]
. . .; but upon the address of both houses of parliament it may
be lawful to remove.them."l This, together with the provision
that judges' compensation could not be diminished, firmly established the independence of the judiciary in England.'
The benefits of judicial independence enjoyed by Englishmen, however, were not shared by their cousins in the American
Colonies. Here the judiciary served at the pleasure of the King.8
Not surprisingly, when revolution came, the Declaration of Independence charged that King George 111 had "made judges dependent on his will alone for the tenure of their offices and the
amount and payment of their salaries." Equally understandable
was the interest of the Framers of the Constitution in establishing
a judiciary with the independence earlier achieved in England.
By following the lead of their English ancestors in granting judges
both tenure "during good behavior" and an undiminishable salary, the Framers were the first to provide guarantees for the independence of the judiciary in a written constitution.
The concept of an independent federal judiciary was not
immediately popular, however. Article 111 drew an inordinate
share of attention in the ratification debate^.^ The lack of immediate acceptance is perhaps understandable because the Colonies
had already developed individual constitutions wherein they took
differing approaches to the judicial branch. Some state legislatures had almost unlimited powers to select and remove judges.
A number of legislatures were required to impeach judges for
misconduct. Other colonies operated with variations on the same
or different themes. lo
5. MAGNA
CARTA
c1. 45.
6 . The Act of Settlement, 1700, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2, § 3; see Ervin, supra note 1, at
110-11.
7. See Nelson, Variations on a Theme-Selection and Tenure of Judges, 36 S . CAL.
L. REV.4, 13-14 (1962); Pittman, The Emancipated Judiciary in America: Its Colonial and
Constitutional History, 37 A.B.A.J. 485 (1951); cf. Shapiro, Judicial Independence: The
English Experience, 55 N.C.L. REV.577 (1977) (explaining the evolution of the notion of
judicial independence within the context of English history).
8. Pittman, supra note 7, at 488.
9. P. BATOR,
D. SHAPIRO,
& H. WECHSLER,
THEFEDERAL
COURTS
AND THE
P. MISHKIN,
FEDERAL
SYSTEM
21-32 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as P. BATOR].
10. See Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution: English and American Precedents, 1969 SUP.CT. REV.135, 138-47.
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Madison, Hamilton, and Jay responded to the opponents of
ratification in The Federalist. Madison's writings stressed the
need for the separation of powers and for effective checks on
power.ll In No. 38 he referred to the impeachment power of the
Senate, and in No. 39 he argued for judicial tenure during good
behavior. Hamilton also wrote in favor of tenure during good
behavior,12and in No. 79 he contended that the independence of
the judges required that removal occur only by the process of
impeachment:
They are liable to be impeached for malconduct by the House
of Representatives and tried by the Senate; and, if convicted,
may be dismissed from office and disqualified for holding any
other. This is the only provision on the point, which is consistent
with the necessary independence of the judicial character

....

"13

Hamilton saw no other excuse for the removal of judges except
insanity.14
It has accurately been said that the Framers "hoped to make
the judges free from popular pressure and from legislative control.
Their purpose was to create a truly independent judiciary limited
only by the cumbersome process of impeachment."15 Their ultimate goal was to create a judiciary sufficiently independent to
resist the natural tendencies of individuals and groups in government to seek dominion once given an original grant of power.
The evolutionary process leading to judicial independence
did not end with the ratification of the Constitution, however.
The era of Chief Justice John Marshall was particularly important in the futher definition of an independent judiciary. For
example, the power of judicial review exercised in Marbury v.
Madison16 was of inestimable value in this developmental process. Likewise important was the acquittal of Justice Samuel
Chase in 1805 in impeachment proceedings before the Senate.
Although the margin was narrow, the acquittal constituted a signal precedent that impeachment and removal were to be reserved
for "serious" offenses of misbehavior, not mere disagreement with
a judge's opinions.17 And certainly the concept of judicial inde11. See THEFEDERALIST
NOS.46, 48 (J. Madison).
12. See id. No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
13. Id. No. 79, at 514 (Bicentennial ed. 1976).
14. Id.
15. Ziskind, supra note 10, at 153.
16. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
17. See Rehnquist, Political Battles for Judicial Independence, 50 WASH.
L. REV.835,
836-42 (1975). The trial and acquittal of Justice Chase established that, in Justice
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pendence continues to receive form and meaning today. Indeed,
the fact that judicial independence is not a static doctrine gives
rise to the basic problem examined in this Article.
It is important to note a t this point that much of what has
been reviewed above supports only the independence of the judicial branch and not necessarily the independence of an individual
judge within that branch. The independence necessary to check
and balance legislative and executive power may be sufficiently
provided without shielding the individual judge from intrabranch
controls. In other words, establishing the major premise that the
judicial branch must be independent does not necessarily require
the conclusion that the individual judge must be free from coercion or control by his peers.
Nevertheless, our firmly established tradition is one of independent judges within an independent judicial branch. Justice
Douglas expressed the tradition in these words:
An independent judiciary is one of this Nation's outstanding
characteristics. Once a federal judge is confirmed by the Senate
and takes his oath, he is independent of every other judge. He
commonly works with other federal judges who are likewise sovereign. But neither one alone nor any number banded together
can act as censor and place sanctions on him.18

Senator Ervin articulated a similar judgment when he noted that
"[tlhe separation of powers concept as understood by the founding fathers assumed the existence of a judicial system free from
outside influence of whatever kind and from whatever source, and
further assumed that each individual judge would be free from
coercion even from his own brethren. "I9
Perhaps this tradition of independent judges is most graphically-if not extravagantly-portrayed by two stories, the first
told by Judge Edward Lumbard, former chief and now senior
judge of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Two district judges
met after they had not seen each other for many months. The
junior of the two summoned a smile and said, "How are you
today, Judge?" After a long pause, the more senior replied, "It's
none of your damn business, and I wouldn't tell you that much if
Rehnquist's words, "the constitutional language conferring tenure on Article 111 judges
'during good behavior' was to be read with a view to the protection of judicial independence even a t the cost of enduring partisan judges." Id. at 842.
18. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 136 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
19. Ervin, supra note 1, a t 121 (emphasis added).
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I hadn't known you for thirty years."20The second story involves
two members of the Supreme Court. Once Justice James C.
McReynolds was late to conference. Chief Justice Hughes said,
"Go tell him we're waiting." The testy McReynolds sent word
back: "Go tell the CJ I don't work for him."21
The question, of course, is whether such autonomy and fierce
independence can or ought to be invariably maintained in an
ever-larger judiciary required to serve an increasingly complex
society.

When the provisions of the Constitution's article I11 were
implemented by the Judiciary Act of 1789,22the six Supreme
Court justices and the widely scattered federal trial court judges
hardly needed any kind of formal administrative structure to
facilitate their work. In the early decades of the Republic, the
federal trial court judges were administratively autonomous in a
nearly absolute sense. Almost like feudal lords, they oversaw, and
had direct control of, all aspects of their court's work.
As the nation developed and society became more complex,
however, the ability of the court system (state and federal) to
serve t h a t society failed to keep pace. Then in 1906, Roscoe
Pound, a Nebraska lawyer and later dean of Harvard Law School,
stimulated a movement for judicial reform and administrative
control with an address before the American Bar A s s ~ c i a t i o n . ~ ~
He charged that our court system was archaic and inefficient and
urged the adoption of organizational reforms that would reduce
the "causes of popular dissatisfaction with the administration of
justice."
Significant reforms in the administration of the federal
courts began soon thereafter. In 1913, former President William
Howard Taft, a man possessed of strong feelings about the importance of administrative machinery to improve the work of the
courts, was appointed Chief Justice of the United States. As President, he had established a commission which studied methods
of improving government. Immediately following his appoint20. Lumbard, The Place of the Federal Judicial Councils in the Administration of
the Courts, 47 A.B.A.J. 169, 170 (1961).
Feb. 1977, at 85.
21. SMITHSONIAN,
22. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73
(1789).
23. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
29 A.B.A. REP.395 (1906), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273 (1964).
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ment to the bench he launched a crusade to do the same in the
judiciary. Fortunately, Taft was in a unique position: he not only
held the highest judicial office in the nation, he also wore the
mantle of an ex-President. Because of his experience in the political arena, he knew full well the practical political implications of
judicial reform. Although some of his ideas met with defeat, he
was able to pave the way for creation of the Judicial Conference
of Senior Circuit Judges (now known as the Judicial Conference
of the United state^).^^ The Judicial Conference of the United
States was created as an informal body to provide a means of
improving communication within the judiciary and facilitating
the assignment of judges to areas with particularly heavy caseloads.25
No additional judicial machinery was engineered for seventeen years. Then, in the Administrative Office Act of 1939,26Congress created two new institutions to assist in judicial administration-the Administrative Office and the judicial councils of the
circuits-and formalized a third-the judicial conferences of the
circuit^.^' Additionally, Congress increased the power of the Judicial Conference of the United States by granting it certain supervisory responsibilities over the newly created Administrative Office. The Administrative Office was directed by the Act to assume
from the Justice Department the ministerial functions of administration within the courts, including the payment of salaries and
the allocation of
The judicial council of the circuit (sometimes referred to as
the circuit council) is composed of the active circuit judges of
each circuit. It is presided over by the chief judge of the circuit
and is required to meet a t least twice annually. Its duties are to
consider the quarterly reports of the Administrative Office and to
"make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within its circuit."29The
district judges of the circuit are directed to "promptly carry into
24. For a review and analysis of Taft's role in judicial administration, see P . FISH,

THEPOLITICS
OF FEDERAL
JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION
24-32 (1973); Fish, William Howard
Taft and Charles Evans Hughes: Conservative Politicians as Chief Judicial Reformers,
1975 SUP.CT. REV.123.
25. Wallace, Must We Have the Nunn Bill?: The Alternative of Judicial Councils of
the Circuits, 51 IND.L.J. 297, 311 (1976).
26. Ch. 501, 53 Stat. 1223 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 48 332-333, 456, 601-610 (1970)).
27. Following the lead of Chief Justice Parker of the Fourth Circuit, other circuits
established informal conferences to improve judicial administration. The 1939 Act mandated the convening of these conferences. See notes 96-100 and accompanying text infra.
28. See Wallace, supra note 25, at 312.
29. 28 U.S.C. 4 332(d) (1970); see Wallace, supra note 25, at 312.
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effect all orders" of the circuit council.30Except for a few specific
provisions appearing elsewhere in the United States Code,31the
grant of power and responsibility in the Administrative Office Act
provides the basis for all the council's formal actions.32
As has been noted, the Administrative Office Act also formalized the judicial conference of the circuit (sometimes referred
to as the circuit conference). The circuit conference, composed of
all district and circuit judges of the circuit plus designated lawyers, is convened "for the purpose of considering the business of
the courts and advising means of improving the administration
of justice within [the] ~ i r c u i t . " ~ T h uthe
s conference has a statutory responsibility to give advice. The recipient of such advice
should be the judicial council of the circuit, which possesses the
power to act in response to it. If the particular advice also involves
other circuits and is otherwise appropriate, the circuit council
should forward the information to the Judicial Conference of the
United States.
Following the reforms legislated in the 1939 Act, the next
major change in judicial administration occurred in 1967 with the
establishment of the Federal Judicial Center.34The statutory purpose of the center is "to further the development and adoption of
improved judicial administration in the courts of the United
state^."^^ The Center is directed to conduct research, make recommendations to the Judicial Conference of the United States,
provide continuing education programs, and assist the Judicial
Conference of the United States and its committee^.^^ The Center
is governed by a Board of Directors made up of two active appellate judges and three active district court judges, together with

.

30. 28 U.S.C. 8 332(d) (1970).
31. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. $ 4 134(c), 137, 140(a), 142, 295, 372(b), 457, 1863(a) (1970).
32. I t should be observed that there has been disagreement concerning the nature of
the circuit councils' powers. Some view the councils as purely administrative bodies
without any judicial powers whose role is to deal with the problems of administering the
courts. Others see the councils as bodies with certain judicial prerogatives, including the
power to determine the fitness of a judge to hear cases. The legislative history is subject
to both interpretations, but it should be noted that the councils were created by an act
designed to speed up the administration of justice. While the possibility of disciplining
problem judges through the councils' tools was considered, discipline was certainly not
the Administrative Office Act's primary purpose. Indeed, two bills aimed specifically a t
the makeup of the judiciary had been expressly rejected by Congress within the three years
prior t o its passage. This fact adds credence to the less expansive view of the scope of the
circuit councils' power, and it is a view that has received some judicial approval. See
Wallace, supra note 25, a t 313.
33. 28 U.S.C. Q 333 (1970).
34. See P. FISH,supra note 24, a t 369.
35. 28 U.S.C. Q 620 (1970).
36. Id.
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the Director of the Administrative Office. This Board of Directors
is chaired by the Chief Justice of the United States."
Reforms in federal judicial administration have thus culminated in a basic administrative machinery with five component
parts. At the top is the Judicial Conference of the United
States-an organization which may be loosely analogized to a
board of directors without the authority to enter orders.38Its
power as such comes from its membership (the Chief Justice of
the United States together with the chief judge of each circuit and
others) and its position at the apex of the judicial administration
structure.
Next in line is the judicial council of the circuit. Made up of
the active circuit judges of the circuit, it too possesses a certain
amount of persuasive power because of its membership. But each
council, as distinguished from the other components in the federal judicial administration system, may "make all necessary
orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the
business of the courts within its circuit."" Although it is not clear
as to how and under what circumstances such orders may be
issued,40strong and articulate voices have called for more action
on the part of the circuit councils.41
The third tier of the judicial administration structure is the
judicial conference of the circuit. Its power is advisory only. The
fourth and fifth components of the administrative structure, the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts and the Federal Judicial Center, provide staff assistance for the other three
tiers.
Close analysis of this administrative structure reveals an intent to decentralize. The power to order has been given solely to
the circuit councils, and the focal point of action should be those
councils. The total machinery provides correlation and, in some
instances, establishes policy. However, any effort to nationalize
and centralize judicial administration a t the highest level would
be a t odds with the present statutory structure.42
37. Id. § 621.
38. See Burger, The Courts on Trial: A Call for Action Against Delay, 44 A.B.A.J.
738, 798 (1958).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1970).
40. See Wallace, supra note 25, at 313; see also Chandler v. Judicial Council of the
Tenth Circuit, 398 U S . 74 (1970).
41. Burger, supra note 38, at 798; Fish, The Circuit Councils: Rusty Hinges of Federal
Judicial Administration, 37 U . CHI.L. REV.203 (1970).
42. Chief Justice Hughes was a strong advocate of decentralization. See Fish, supra
note 24, at 140-44; Lumbard, supra note 20, at 169. When a proposed bill giving all
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Significantly, the five-component administrative structure
outlined above is essentially intrabranch. The Constitution itself, of course, provides the one significant extrabranch control
over the judiciary: impeachment and removal. Yet, despite the
fact that any additional nonconstitutional extrabranch control
raises serious questions involving the separation of powers doctrine and the independence of the judiciary, efforts have been
made repeatedly to create such extrabranch controls.
A recent example involved the congressional formulation of
the code of judicial ethics. In 1924 the American Bar Association,
in cooperation with the judiciary, approved the Canons of Judicial E t h i m d 3Subsequently, there was additional pressure to
renew or revise the canons to control more directly the activities
of the judges.44As a result, the Judicial Conference of the United
States, on June 10, 1969, adopted regulations forbidding the acceptance of income from nonjudicial sources without prior approval of the judicial council of the circuit.45This action was
subsequently suspended to await the formulation by the Ameri.~~
can Bar Association of a new Code of Judicial C o n d u ~ tWhen
the Code appeared, it was adopted by the Judicial Conference of
the United States." Congress, however, was not satisfied with the
judiciary's efforts to establish its own rules and therefore passed
a statute, which in some ways conflicted with the standards
adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United States.48
-

--

administrative authority to one national administrative office came to his attention, he
responded in these terms:
I think the difficulty in this present bill lies in an undue centralization . . . My
thought is that there should be a greater attention to local authority and local
responsibility . . . My thought is that in each circuit there should be an organization which will have direct and immediate responsibility with regard to the
judicial work in that circuit. My suggestion for your consideration is that there
should be in each circuit a judicial council . . . .
J . Covington, Autonomy v. Efficiency-The Continuing Debate on Judicial Supervision
of Federal Trial Judges 56 n.111 (July 23,1973) (unpublished paper presented to executive
session of judges of United States District Courts and United States Court of Appeals of
the Ninth Circuit, in San Francisco) (quoting Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial
Conference of the United States 12 (1938)).
PROB.9,
43. McKay, The Judiciary and Nonjudicial Activities, 35 LAW& CONTEMP.
15 (1970).
44. Id.
45. Clark, Judicial Self-Regulation-Its Potential, 35 LAW& CONTEMP.
PROB.37, 40
(1970); see Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 138 (1970)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED
STATES
9
46. REPORT
(1970).
OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED
STATES
947. REPORTOF THE PROCEEDINGS
11 (1973).
48. Compare AMERICAN
BARASSOCIATION,
CODEOF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT,
canon 3C (1972)
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A more significant and threatening example of nonjudicial
efforts to control the judiciary has been the rather constant agitation for some type of machinery which could remove federal
judges without the lengthy process of impeachment. Such a legislative effort was initiated in the late l930's, primarily due to the
~ recent attempt
efforts of Congressman Hatton S u m n e r ~A. ~more
was made in 1966 by Senator Joseph Tydings, then chairman of
the Subcommittee on Improvements of Judicial M a ~ h i n e r yThe
.~~
most recent effort to provide a means for circumventing the impeachment process was made by Senator Nunn in 1975.51I have
discussed the Nunn bill elsewhere, arguing that it is unwise and
Each year new legislation aimed at controlling the functioning of the judiciary in one fashion or another is presented to
Congress. Pending before the federal legislature are two bills that
would require full financial disclosure annually by each federal
and a bill to establish a judicial tenure council to deal
with, among other things, removal of federal judges for improper
In recent years, bills have been introduced that would
strike the grandfather clause from the statute that forbids a chief
judge from serving past the age of 70,55and that would provide
for the review of the behavior of individual justices and judges by
a three-judge panel? In addition, Congress had before it both a
proposed constitutional amendment requiring reconfirmation of
Supreme Court Justices every eight years and lower court judges
every six years,57and proposed articles of impeachment aimed a t
the forty-four federal judges who brought a lawsuit against the
United States contending that their compensation had been unconstitutionally d i m i n i ~ h e d . ~ ~
with Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, 88 Stat. 1609 (amending 28 U.S.C. $ 455
(1970)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1974).
49. See Wallace, supra note 25, at 303.
50. See id. at 303-04.
51. See id. a t 297, 302-11.
52. Id. at 297.
53. H.R. 4453, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 3828, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
No action has yet been taken on these bills.
54. S. 1423, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
55. S. 1130, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The grandfather clause provides that the
retirement provision is inapplicable to any district with two judges where the chief judge
continues to act in his capacity as chief judge. Id. 4 3.
56. H.R. 10439, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
57. S.J. Res. 175, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
58. H.R. Res. 1066,94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); see Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d
1028 (Ct. C1. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 718 (1978) (Congress' nondiscriminatory failure
to raise judicial salaries not violative of compensation clause).
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This Article later argues that the need for controls to facilitate effective judicial administration has never been greater.5gAt
this point, however, it is necessary to state emphatically that the
extrabranch controls of the sort just reviewed are not what the
nation, or the judiciary, needs. In the first place, extrabranch
controls by their very nature create a serious risk of violating the
fundamental doctrine of separation of powers. As Justice Sutherland stated: "The sound application of [that doctrine] that
makes one master in his own house precludes him from imposing
his control in the house of another who is master there?O Also,
the purpose of many of the proposed extrabranch controls is to
regulate judges whose personal conduct is deemed aberrational.
Yet even the most ardent advocates of extrabranch controls
admit that it is only the personal conduct of a very few that is
open to question. Senator Tydings referred to the "tiny handful"
of judges who harm the efficient administration of justice and
then stated that "it is not our intention to conduct an expos6 on
the federal judiciary. Such an expose would, indeed, find little to
expo~e."~'
The independence of the judiciary should not be compromised by a system of controls prompted by the improprieties
of a very few. Finally, the judiciary itself has both the administrative structure, if properly used, and the ability necessary to implement reforms that will successfully meet many of the challenges that make effective judicial administration imperative.
While the quality of the federal judiciary is high, the need
for effective administration in the federal courts is not seriously
contested. The root cause of that need is, of course, the massive
increase in the workload of the federal courts a t all levels. At the
district court level, the number of new cases filed each year since
1970 has increased 42%, to an average of about 450 cases per
j u d g e ~ h i p . 'Particular
~
types of cases have increased dramatically. In 1976, for example, 85% more environmental cases were
filed than in 1973." In 1970 there was a disconcerting backlog of
114,000 cases awaiting disposal. By 1975 that number had risen
to 142,000,64despite the fact that in the five years from 1970 to
59. See notes 62-69 and accompanying text infra.
60. Humphrey's Ex'r. v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 630 (1935).
61. Procedures for the Removal, Retirement, and Disciplining of Unfit Federal
Judges: Hearings on Judicial Fitness Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 4 (1966).
62. Burger, Year End Report, 62 A.B.A.J. 189 (1976).
OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED
STATES
63. REPORTS
197 (1976).
64. See Burger, supra note 62, at 189.
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1975 district court judges improved their productivity-measured
in terms of cases disposed of-by 27%.65The growth in the workload of federal appellate courts has been even more dramatic.
Appellate filings increased a t the rate of 113% between 1968 and
1976; during this same period, the backlog of undecided cases
grew by 83%.66
It is not just the sheer number of cases, however, but also the
types of cases which are being handled by the federal courts that
intensify the problem. Environmental and consumer litigation,
for example, tend to "require judicial energy output far beyond
the average case?' A related problem is exemplified by the recently enacted Speedy Trial Act? That legislation, while not
directly increasing the judiciary's workload per se, will cause
immense problems of caseload management because it severely
compresses the disposition time permitted in criminal cases?
The result of this ever-mounting number of increasingly
complex cases is delay and congestion in the federal courts. That
delay has now reached such proportions that society is no longer
being properly served by its judicial system. In response to the
problem, a wide variety of solutions have been proposed. Despite
their diversity of source and content, all these proposals have one
common characteristic: they will necessarily entail, either directly or indirectly, some incremental increase in control over
federal judges and their work.70Indeed, any solution that entirely
avoids increased control seems incapable of formulation. Accordingly, if the problem is to be solved to any measurable degree, the
solution will to some extent reduce the independence of individual judges and the independence of the judicial branch.

Conflict between the ideals of judicial independence and
effective judicial administration is pervasive on a theoretical
level. This is due primarily to the difficulty of defining the ideals
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. Rosenberg, Planned Flexibility to Meet Changing Needs of the Federal Appellate
L. REV.576, 582 (1974).
System, 59 CORNELL
68. 18 U.S.C. $0 3161-3174 (Supp. V 1975).
69. Division of Information Systems, Statistical Analysis and Reports Branch &
Office of the General Counsel, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Impact
Study: The Effect of Major Statutes and Events on Criminal and Civil Caseload in the
U.S. District Courts During Fiscal Years 1960-1975, at 28 (Apr. 19, 1976).
70. One possible exception to this statement might be proposals that would simply
increase the number of federal judges. See, e.g., H.R.7843,95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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in any terms short of absolute. Judicial independence may most
readily be defined as a freedom, possessed by the individual
judge, to dispose of all business brought before him, to manage
the personnel attached to his court and its physical aspects, and
to conduct his personal affairs as he sees fit and without limitations in the form of externally imposed formal controls. In the
same vein, judicial administration in its broadest sense may be
defined as any formal system or structure that places coercive
authority in any individual, group of individuals, or institution
which is or can be exercised to determine how or when business
before the individual judge will be handled, how court facilities
and personnel will be managed, or w'hat course the judge's personal conduct will or will not take."
On a practical level, the scope of actual conflict is narrow-at
least in comparison to the scope of conflict theoretically possible.
This is due in part to tradition. For example, appellate review of
a trial court's factual and legal conclusions in a particular case is
not deemed an encroachment on judicial independence, although
that review certainly operates to control the work of the trial
judge. In addition, congressionally designed limitations on the
jurisdiction of the federal courts likewise constitute a significant
external control, but because that control is generally considered
to be constitutionally based72it rarely is viewed as an assault on
the citadel of judicial autonomy. Then too, uniform rules of procedure present theoretical but generally no practical conflicts. All
of these examples may be viewed as the products of old compromises, although perhaps not recognized as such at the time of
their making.
The actual conflicts, that is, the conflicts which are presently
perceived as such, arise out of the attempted use of new forms of
control. Thus, the first order of a circuit council prohibiting the
future assignment of cases to a district judge was litigated to the
Supreme Court where it was expressly recognized that the ultimate issue was whether that action constituted "permissible intervention consistent with the constitutional requirement of judicial independence."'Wther relatively new forms of control already discussed, such as limits on and reports concerning extraju71. This definition of judicial administration is used only to show the theoretical
extent of the judicial independence-judicial administration conflict. It is not the definition
of judicial administration that I would adopt for all purposes. For a discussion of various
CASESAND MATERIALS
ON JUDICIAL
definitions of judicial administration, see D. NELSON,
AND THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE
XXV-xxvi(1974).
ADMINISTRATION
72. See P. BATOR,
supra note 9, at 309-438.
73. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 84 (1970).
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dicial compensation, are also considered by some judges as inconsistent with their independen~e.'~
A striking example of the perceived conflict which arises
when new controls are introduced was revealed in comments
made by members of the judiciary a t the time of the establishment of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
For example, one judge stated:
A word of warning is appropriate. It is inevitable that a director
[of the Administrative Office] will come to feel that he has
something to direct. As long as he confines his direction to the
staff under him, he is performing his duty, but when he interferes with the work of the judges he should promptly and emphatically be reb~ffed.'~

Another judge warned t h a t the "judicial reform movement is
tending too far in the direction of subordinating the administrative authority of the trial judge."76 Now, however, the transfer of
most of a judge's logistical and general housekeeping duties to the
Administrative Office is, as to those chores, infrequently viewed
as a check on judicial independence. Although a few judges view
that office as a threatening bureaucratic giant, most are gladly
relieved of minor ministerial tasks. They may well share the sentiments of Judge Learned Hand: "I utterly loathe . . . and thoroughly despise [administrative tasks], as 'work for the learned
pig' as John Grey used to say of c~nveyancing."~~
However, if the
Administrative Office begins to assert added control, above and
beyond minor housekeeping responsibilities, the specter of conflict would again arise.
Another form of administrative control which has drawn
some criticism as it has extended itself into new areas is the office
of chief judge. Within each circuit court, and within each district
court which has more than two district judges, the judge who is
most senior in service and has not yet reached the age of 70 is
designated the chief judge, unless he declines to act.78The chief
judge exercises supervisory powers in many areas. Although these
responsibilities are administrative in nature, a strong chief
74. See, e.g., id. at 138-41 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
75. J. Covington, supra note 42, at 5 (quoting comments of then Senior Circuit Judge
Curtis D. Wilbur).
76. Chandler, The Role of the Trial Judge in the Anglo-American Legal System, 50
A.B.A.J. 125, 129 (1964).
77. Letter from Learned Hand to D. Lawrence Groner (Apr. 5, 1944), reprinted in P.
FISH,supra note 24, at 405.
78. 28 U.S.C. § § 45, 136 (1970).
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judge-because of his centralized administrative powers, the respect which is held for his office, and, in some cases, his personality-exercises a significant degree of control over his brother and
sister judges.7gAs a result, the chief judge is often able to work
informally to solve problems, and do so as effectively and sometimes more effectively than administrators working through the
.~~
formal administrative machinery established by C o n g r e ~ sNevertheless, the role of the chief judge, when maintained within
traditional boundaries, is probably universally accepted by
judges. Criticism surfaces only when the chief judge assumes new
functions. If one commentator is correct, a new area of conflict is
on the horizon. He predicted that
[Wlithin the judicial segment, the individual judges will probably encounter a growing shift of power to the chief (or presiding) judge and to his court administrator, both of whom will
increasingly employ technology to standardize the quantity and
directions of case decisions. . . . [This] initial sharing of administrative power will lead, by accretion, to the dominance of
court administrators (staff personnel) over the chief judges (the
line superiors) because of the greater expertise possessed by the
former

In light of the above discussion, it appears that new forms of
administrative control-whether designed from whole cloth or
developed in evolutionary fashion from traditional forms-are
almost inevitable. As the federal judiciary becomes larger, as its
workload continues to burgeon, and as the type of work it does
becomes more complex, the judiciary or some external institution
like Congress will modify the judiciary's structure and methods
of operation to accommodate these changes. If history is a sound
guide, and it probably is in this area, these new controls will
create conflict by pitting the ideal of judicial independence
against the ideal of effective judicial administration. That conflict need not be disruptive, however. Beneficial compromises are
possible, although not assured.
FRAMEWORK
FOR COMPROMISE
IV. A CONCEPTUAL
Two insights into the fundamental nature of the judicial
79. See Weinstein, The Role of a Chief Judge in a Modern System of Justice, 28 REC.
A.B. CITY N.Y. 291 (1973); Prettyman, The Duties of a Circuit Chief Judge, 46 A.B.A.J.
633 (1960).
80. See Wallace, supra note 25, at 324-25.
L. REV.
81. Gazell, Developmental Syndromes in Judicial Management, 38 BROOKLYN
587, 620 (1972).
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independence-judicial administration conflict permit development of a conceptual framework for compromise. The first insight, developed by Professor Covington, is that judicial independence is divisible into separate, although related, compon e n t ~ Covington
.~~
identifies these as "logistical or housekeeping autonomy," "decision autonomy," and "trial practice and
personal conduct autonomy."" The second insight is surprisingly simple although continually overlooked: Both ideals of
judicial independence and effective judicial administration are
not ends in themselves but merely means of achieving a more
fundamental goal, which may be called, for want of a better term,
the doing of justice.
In Covington's analysis, logistical or housekeeping autonomy
involves the judge's control over such activities as personnel
selection, recordkeeping, reporting of data on the court's work,
and operation of the court's budget. Decision autonomy is the
power of the judge to make decisions in the cases before him.
Trial practice autonomy consists of the judge's power to determine what his conduct shall be on the bench and how the activities in his courtroom shall be regulated. Personal conduct autonomy is the power of the judge to determine the course of his offthe-bench conduct.84
Administrative innovations that can fairly be said to implicate only logistical autonomy generally are not viewed as inimical
to judicial independence. Housekeeping chores for the most part
have been shifted already to the Administrative Office. This
transfer of responsibilities was, in part, a response to the massive
amount of detail work necessary for the functioning of a large and
complex judicial system. As has been noted, the shift in responsibility for these chores has not been a major source of i r r i t a t i ~ n . ~ ~
The difficulty, of course, is to identify innovations which
implicate only logistical autonomy. This difficulty is illustrated
by the Justice Department's 1932 attempt to eliminate the position of messenger of the federal judge. In response, the Judicial
Conference of the Fourth Circuit passed a resolution stating that
such action would decrease the performance of the district judges
and would delay and interfere with prompt handling of judicial
business.86Is access to a messenger purely an incident of logistical
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

J. Covington, supra note 42.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3.
See text accompanying notes 76-77 supra.
See P.FISH,
supra note 24, at 150-51.
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autonomy or does it involve decision autonomy? True the messenger would not make decisions, but if he would preserve valuable time and allow a judge to carry out his decisionmaking processes more adequately and promptly, it can reasonably be
argued that elimination of the messenger would be an incursion
into judicial independence.
While logistical autonomy may be reduced without impairing judicial independence, complete preservation of decision autonomy is fundamental. Even the most ardent proponents of increased administrative control voice support for the sovereignty
of the individual judge in this area. The following observation of
Professor Covington conveys the view of most observers regarding
decision autonomy, a view that is fully supported by the history
of judicial independence outlined in Section I:
[I]t is incumbent upon the judges themselves to fight back if
efficiency programs become overzealous and interfere with
"total and absolute independence of judges in deciding cases or
in any phase of the decisional function." An independent judiciary is not a luxury. The country can afford some inefficient
judges if the price of efficiency is damage to decision autonom~.~~

The tensions and conflicts between judicial administration
and judicial independence most frequently manifest themselves
in the area of trial practice and personal conduct autonomy. This
conflict surfaced in Chandler v. Judicial Council of t h e T e n t h
CircuitRRwhen a circuit council prohibited the assignment of any
new cases to a district judge. Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Burger intimated that in this area autonomy is a diminishable commodity.
There can, of course, be no disagreement among us as to the
imperative need for total and absolute independence of judges
in deciding cases or in any phase of the decisional function. But
it is quite another matter to say that each judge in a complex
system shall be the absolute ruler of his manner of conducting
judicial business. The question is whether Congress can vest in
the Judicial Council power to enforce reasonable standards as
to when and where court shall be held, how long a case may be
delayed in decision, whether a given case is to be tried, and
many other routine matters. As to these things-and indeed an
almost infinite variety of others of an administrative na87. J. Covington, supra note 42, at 43.
88. 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
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ture-can each judge be an absolute monarch and yet have a
complex judicial system function e f f i c i e n t l ~ ? ~ ~

In dissent, Justices Black and Douglas forcefully argued against
any encroachment on trial practice and personal conduct autonomy by any means other than impeachment and removal.g0This
sharp conflict of opinions is representative of the tensions inherent in this area.
That tension is aggravated because the opposing factions
tend to view their respective causes-either judicial independence or effective judicial administration-as a final goal, an ultimate and inviolable ideal. The historic evolution of the concept
of judicial independence and the judicial administration reform
movement outlined in the first two sections of this Article effectively refutes those extreme views. Both ideals have a purpose
beyond their own self-perpetuation, namely the meaningful dispensation of justice. Neither judicial independence nor judicial
efficiency is of value unless it contributes to that ultimate goal,
and it is against that goal that proposed administrative reforms
should be measured. Any innovation that furthers the ubiquitous
trend toward standardization and uniformity merely for the sake
of the appearance of efficiency should be rejected. By the same
token, if an innovation realistically promises to make the dispensation of justice swifter and surer, and hence more meaningful,
no judge could in good conscience oppose that reform unless it
constituted an unwarranted infringement on judicial independence and therefore a long term threat to the personal liberties of
all citizens. What is required, in short, is a n evaluative and balancing process.
An important observation should be made about the evaluative aspect of that process. It would be a serious mistake to attack
all present inefficiencies in the judicial system as inappropriate.
Chief Judge David Bazelon has reminded us that
the heart of the judicial process is by its very nature inefficient.
The way towards "efficiency" in the courts is not to shortcut
judicial procedures in order to dispose of more cases in less time.
Such a solution is equivalent to a surgeon's omitting timeconsuming diagnostic procedures and simply operating at rand o m . . . .91
89. Id. at 84-85.
90. Id. at 129-43 (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
91. Bazelon, New Gods for Old: "Efficient" Courts in a Democratic Society, 46
N.Y.U.L.REV.653, 660 (1971).
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Joseph Ebersole of the Federal Judicial Center has reached a
similar conclusion. In discussing the unique problems of formulating a design process for computer application in a court system, he observed that the judicial system is, to some extent, a
nonsystem.
Supposedly, people in an organization all work to further one
general objective and although there are opposing forces in existence, these are normally not intended to operate a t cross purposes. Business organizations, for example, strive for efficiency
and attempt to systematize as many activities as possible to
further this goal. But the administration of justice is, in some
respects, inherently inefficient. The due process model is a purposive obstacle course and its inefficiency and, what some might
consider its irrationality, provide major protection to individuals .92

When judges, in the name of judicial autonomy, defend these
necessary inefficiencies and demonstrate a reluctance to change,
the reluctance should not be viewed as mere obstreperousness.
The reluctance is motivated rather by the basic belief, held by
most judges, that the system can work effectively to provide justice only so long as judges are free and independent in their ultimate decisionmaking process.

As new forms of administrative controls have created new
judicial independence-judicial administration tensions, accommodations and compromises have occurred. Unfortunately, these
compromises have all too often been products of default and inaction rather than of an open process of evaluation and balancing.
An example of this sort of compromise may be seen in the
conduct of the circuit councils. The discussion in Section TI
makes it clear that the circuit councils have authority to issue
orders which could interfere with the trial practice autonomy of
district judges as well as their personal conduct.93Yet, in many
instances, the circuit councils have been reluctant to enter into
this arena.94This reticence cannot be ascribed wholly to roadblocks which might be inferred from dicta in Chandler v. Judicial
92. Ebersole & Hall, Courtran: A Modular Management and Research System for
OF THE INTERNATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM
ON CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
INFORMACourts, in PROCEEDINGS
TION AND STATISTICS
SYSTEMS
203, 204 (1972).
93. See generally J. Covington, supra note 42, at 27-35.
94. See P. FISH,supra note 24, at 404-09.
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Council of the Tenth C i r c ~ i tRather
. ~ ~ it appears that a compromise between judicial independence and effective judicial administration has been made in the actual practice of the circuit councils. Although Congress initially struck the compromise in one
fashion, the circuit councils, by silent practice, have made another compromise, tilting the final result more towards judicial
independence. While that result may be wise, the process used to
reach it is certainly vulnerable to criticism.
A similar phenomenon is visible in the workings of the judicial conference of the circuit. Although the conference has great
potential for ameliorating the conflict between judicial independence and judicial administration, it has not realized its potential.
This failure seems to reflect the same sort of subterranean process
of compromise that has defined the role of the circuit councils.
As orginally conceived, the circuit conference was to be an engine
for the administrative reform of the federal courts. Patterned on
the informal conferences organized by Chief Judge Parker of the
Fourth Circuit in the early 1930's, circuit conferences were initially appreciated as being an exceptional tool for improving judicial administration in a decentralized organizational s t r u c t ~ r e . ~ ~
"A Circuit Conference," stressed a 1932 report to the then Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, "serves to bring together
all the Federal Judges of the circuit and thus to give opportunity
for the consideration of problems with which they are confronted
in seeking to eliminate obstructions to the prompt and efficient
~ ~ early
administration of justice in the several d i s t r i ~ t s . "These
conferences provided a forum for discussing docket backlogs,
unnecessary disparity in sentences, customs, rules and regulations in the district courts, and the other myriad administrative
problems of the judiciary. In some circuit conferences, this interchange breached the wall of isolation surrounding many district
courts. Moreover, the conferences were natural sources of information for the Judicial Conference of the United States. It was
the hope of Chief Justice Hughes that the circuits, with the aid
of the circuit conferences, might act as foci of federal action affecting the judicial branch, much as the states were foci of administration with regard to the state problems.98
The Administrative Office Act of 1939,99which mandated the
95. 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
96. See Morse, Federal Judicial Conferences and Councils: Their Creation and
Reports, 27 CORNELL
L. REV.347, 354-57 (1942).
97. [I9321 AIT'Y GEN.ANN.REP.12.
98. See P. FISH,supra note 24, at 145-46.
99. Ch. 501, 53 Stat. 1223 (codified at 28 U.S.C. $5 332-333, 456, 601-610 (1970)).
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convening of the circuit conferences,loOwas intended to further
this work. The five entities of judicial administration discussed
in Section 11 were intended to gear their efforts to improving the
administration of justice by permitting the federal courts, operating within a decentralized structure, to set their own houses in
order.lOlIt was Congress' judgment that, in order for the courts
to deal with basic problems of court administration within each
circuit, the deliberative and advisory role of the circuit conference
was essential.
In addition, the circuit conferences are interrelated with the
circuit councils. To perform their distinctive function, the circuit
councils require the current, firsthand experience of the federal
trial courts, the basic unit of the federal justice system. Often this
experience is not forthcoming through informal channels or is
only imperfectly communicated. In response to this problem,
Congress designed the judicial conference of the circuit to serve
both as a forum where that experience can be expressed and a s a
conduit to convey the information. The power of the circuit conference therefore consists of its membership-the district and
circuit court judges and representative lawyers who practice before them. These individuals, who have the most accurate information and the most pertinent recommendations regarding the
problems of prompt and efficient administration of justice can
use the circuit conference to coordinate, concentrate and communicate that information to the circuit council and, through the
chief judge of the circuit, to the Judicial Conference of the United
States.lo2
The circuit conference thus has a distinctive role in judicial
administration. Significantly, however, it is without the power to
give orders or specific direction to district court judges. Accordingly, judges generally do not, and certainly should not, view it
as a direct threat to their independence. Nevertheless, the conferences have not met with the success that might be anticipated.
Chief Justice Burger has stated:
This provision (Section 333) like Section 332, has been fully
used and applied by only a minority, at least, of the Circuits in
the sense clearly contemplated by Congress in its express language and plainly indicated by the legislative history. . . .
[Lless than a majority of the circuits have consistently held
-

-

-

100. Id. § 3 0 l (codified st 28 U.S.C. 9 333 (1970)).
101. See generally J. Covington, supra note 42, at 15-16,27-28.
102. 28 U.S.C.§ 333 (1970).
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meaningful conferences and in some places the conferences
which are held fall far short of what Congress intended.lo3

This inactivity of the circuit conferences may stem from the
judges' belief that full compliance with the mandate of Congress
will result in further interference with their independence. The
basis of this belief merits examination. The first part of the statutory mandate directs the conference to meet together to consider
the business of the courts.lo4This directive in and of itself should
not give rise to any fear that judicial autonomy will be imperiled.
Indeed, most judges feel that discussion of common problems has
a beneficial effect in assisting them in their official capacity. If
in fact judicial reticence to a fully implemented circuit conference
is due to a fear that it may result in further administrative controls, that reticence must be based on the second part of the
legislative directive: The conferences are to recommend "means
of improving the administration of justice within such circuit."lo5
This advice of the circuit conference is undoubtedly to be directed
to the circuit council, which possesses the statutory authority to
make "all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within its circuit."lo6
Some judges may believe that the advice-giving role of the conference gives it an appreciable measure of indirect administrative
power, a power capable ultimately of further reducing the autonomy of the individual judge. If this conjecture is correct, the
relative inactivity of the circuit conferences is simply a camouflaged compromise. By defaulting in their advice-giving role
under the statute, the judges may well be responding to the inevi- -

--

-

103. Burger, supra note 38, a t 741.
104. The statutory language is as follows:
The chief judge of each circuit shall summon annually the circuit and
district judges of the circuit, in active service, to a conference a t a time and place
that he designates, for the purpose of considering the business of the courts and
advising means of improving the administration of justice within such circuit.
He shall preside a t such conference, which shall be known as the Judicial Conference of the circuit. The judges of the United States District Court for the
District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court
of the Virgin Islands shall also be summoned annually to the conferences of their
respective circuits.
Every judge summoned shall attend, and unless excused by the chief judge,
shall remain throughout the conference.
The court of appeals for each circuit shall provide by its rules for representation and active participation a t such conference by members of the bar of such
circuit.
28 U.S.C. § 333 (1970).
105. Id.
106. Id. § 332(d).
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table tension between the need for system controls and their own
independence.
To the extent that such a compromise has been reached, it
is an unfortunate one. In the first place, a nonproductive circuit
conference is disruptive of the integrated administrative machinery of the federal judiciary, a "machinery, created by Congress,
to provide means whereby the work of the courts could be regulated and kept up to date, and provide a better and more prompt
administration of justice."lo7 Because the elements of this administrative machinery are interrelated and interdependent, an active and effective circuit conference is necessary to the success of
the system as a whole. Moreover, a circuit conference not performing its proper role must inevitably undercut support for decentralization. Paradoxically, by refusing to use the circuit conference for fear of diminishing his own independence, a judge
renders less effective a structure purposely decentralized in order
to give individual judges a greater influence in the administrative
decisionmaking process.108The tragic consequence of this is that
when the need for controls becomes sufficiently acute, the circuit
councils, in order to obviate possible extrajudicial intervention,
may well assert their latent authority to control the course of
judicial administration. Hopefully that action will be based upon
the advice and assistance of the district court judges and lawyers
rendered a t the circuit conferences. But this can occur only if the
conferences are functioning properly. log Accordingly, by diminishing the vigor of the circuit conference, its judicial members may
well be facilitating the promulgation of administrative controls
by the circuit council or by a national governmental authority
which may severely threaten judicial independence.

VI. CONCLUSION
It is time to recognize that decisions made in judicial administration are compromises between the conflicting needs for judicial independence on the one hand and systems control on the
other. Too often, advocates have asserted their positions in a
vacuum, oblivious of the need to consider the legitimate concerns
of the opposing position. Only by recognizing those legitimate
107. S. REP.NO. 426, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1939).
108. See note 42 and accompanying text supra; see also Fish, supra note 24, at 14044.
109. For what one circuit conference has done, see Final Report of Committee on
Reorganizaton of the Ninth Circuit Conference and Conference Committees, 75.F.R.D. 553
(1976).
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concerns and the inevitability of compromise in appropriate areas
can intelligent decisions be made. What is needed, therefore, is
an open evaluative and balancing process.
Chief Justice Burger has identified the need for change in the
system, contending that we now use cracker-barrel-grocery methods in a supermarket age.l1° While the cracker barrel must go, its
replacement must not unduly interfere with the independence of
the grocer. Here lies the judicial administration challenge of the
future.
---

-

-

110. Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929 (1970).

